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Where Nothing Happened: The Experience of War Captivity and 
Levinas’s Concept of the ‘There Is’ 
 
Introduction 
 
In June 1940, a year into the Second World War and long after the Nazi persecution of Jews 
had begun, something remarkable happened. A Jewish officer in the French army, openly 
declaring his faith to his captors in the expectation of a certain death, was taken into German 
war captivity and detained there in accordance with international law. He was released 
unharmed five years later. 
 
 
The officer in question was Emmanuel Levinas. He was not an exception; just amongst the 
French forces that fell into German hands were 55,000 Jews (Spoerer, 2005: 505; Annette 
Wieviorka (2001: 106) gives a much lower figure of 10,000-15,000), and nearly all survived 
German war captivity. In this respect, the Jewish members of the French armed forces were 
in no different position than their non-Jewish colleagues, as both Jews and non- Jews were 
equally protected by the French uniform. Nor was Levinas alone amongst 20th century French 
thinkers to count war captivity amongst his wartime experiences. Fernand 
Page 3 of 47  
 
 
 
 
 
Braudel, Jean-Paul Sartre and Paul Ricoeur, to name only a few, were also in German war 
captivity. 
 
 
And yet, Levinas’s experiences are of specific legal interest in a way that the experiences of 
others may not be.1 This interest stems not so much from the particular details of his captors’ 
(often less than perfect) compliance with the laws of war than from the particular juridico-
political space (in the sense in which Agamben (1998) applies this term to the concentration 
camp) in which Levinas found himself as a protected Jew in Germany. Jewish prisoners of 
war (‘POWs’) were in a special position because they were excluded from two fronts, that of 
the limited war fought between Germany and its enemies on the Western front and that of 
the unlimited ‘war’ between Germany and those whom it regarded as its racial foes. While 
all members of the French armed forces could expect their exclusion from further 
involvement in the conflict after they had surrendered, this being required by the rules of the 
war in which they were engaged, Jewish members were at the same time part of a conflict to 
which no such rules applied. Hitler’s persecution of Jews did not just go to their national but 
to their religious and biological identity; resisting him was not just a fight in which one risked 
one’s life to win, but a fight for life or death. There should have been no middle ground 
between these poles, and yet the Jewish prisoners 
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found themselves in the midst of German territory, their lives protected by the very same 
people who absolutely wanted them dead. 
 
 
The difficulty of situating the space of the POW camp within the order of war also applies to 
its legal co-ordinates. Surely, the camp was a legal space (rather than a space outside of law), 
as it excluded the Jewish prisoners from the extra-legal force of the persecutions. But it also 
excluded them from exercising their legal agency both in war and in civilian life, to which 
POWs were not permitted to return until the end of the war. If the camp was not a space that 
permitted the exercise of legal agency, yet did not release the prisoners into an extra-legal 
space of freedom, where and what was it? Was it a prison, as its name suggests, even though 
there was no intention on the part of the law to punish or reform those within it? Was it a 
protective space, even though this protection was not aimed at prisoners’ individual agency 
(on the contrary, this was suspended) and merely ensured their collective survival as living 
bodies for the purpose of limiting war? What did this absence of engagement that prisoners 
experienced – whether by law or by other forces – mean for their existence in the camp? 
Page 5 of 47  
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to these questions about the status of the camp and the kind of existence it 
afforded, Levinas’s war-time experiences can also be singled out for another reason. He 
wrote a philosophical work in captivity that he published after the war under the title 
Existence and Existents. The main concept developed in this work in a section entitled 
Existence Without Existents is the ‘there is’ (il y a), a concept that Levinas all but abandoned 
in his post-war turn towards the ethical relation to the other.2 
 
The ‘there is’ has been described as ‘one of Levinas’ most fascinating propositions’ 
(Blanchot, 1986: 49), leading Jacques Derrida, who ‘discovered Existence and Existents by 
chance in a Paris bookshop in the early 1960s’ (Bernasconi, 2001: vii), first to engage with 
Levinas’s work (see Derrida, 1978). However, the ‘there is’ has also been described as 
elusive – ‘Levinas can barely say even what it is not’ (Bernasconi, 2001: xii) – and this may 
explain the concept’s ‘inherent impenetrability’ (Bernasconi, 2001: xv). Indeed, it is not 
uncommon to regard the ‘there is’ as reflecting no experience at all, even as something that 
is by definition beyond experience. Hent de Vries (2005: 388-389) thus regards the ‘there is’ 
as the result of a pure thought experiment by which persons and things are subtracted from 
the world until nothing is left that could be phenomenologically accessed or represented. De 
Vries writes that even though Levinas philosophically reflects on the 
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impersonal, undifferentiated being – the ‘there is’ – that remains after the world has been 
emptied of persons and things, ‘he admits that there can be no representation of this 
dimension.’ De Vries consequently questions whether it is possible for Levinas to keep a 
place in his discourse ‘for this shadow side of our existence.’ 
 
 
This article makes no claim of being able to engage with these philosophical theories on their 
own terms; however, it does offer the description of a legal space (the POW camp) in which 
people experienced non-experience. It is true, for a small minority of Western forces German 
war captivity turned out to be a time of study, sporting endeavours and attempts to escape. 
However, for the vast number of Western POWs, the years of their captivity were filled to 
varying extents with drudgery and boredom, a seemingly endless wait on the prisoners’ part 
to be released into a life once more of their own making. 
 
 
On the basis of this experience by the majority, war captivity and the legal space of the POW 
camp could perhaps simply be dismissed as uninteresting, particularly when compared with 
its ‘big brother,’ the concentration camp (‘big’ in terms of the amount of relevant scholarship, 
not in terms of the number of people who passed through it; this is dwarfed by the estimated 
35m people in war captivity in the Second World War (Davis, 
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1977: 162)). When Levinas (2009: 201) begins a short piece on his experiences as a POW by 
stating that ‘[e]verything has been said of captivity,’ he thus means that there is really nothing 
interesting to add, that it is simply a matter of ‘the greyness of the barbed wire enclosure’ and 
‘foggy mornings when one leaves for work’ (Levinas, 2009: 201). 
 
 
However, at least from a historical perspective, it seems that not much has been said yet. It 
has thus been noted that despite significant progress in this respect over the last decades, 
historical scholarship from a global comparative perspective on war captivity in the Second 
World War is only in its beginning stages, most historians having concentrated on the 
Holocaust in its wider sense, including the fate of Soviet POWs in Germany (Bischof et al., 
2005: 14-15). And although there is a sizeable amount of legal scholarship on the laws 
relating to POWs, most of it is narrow in focus, concentrating on specific norms and legal 
arrangements (Overmans, 1999a: 487). 
 
 
One is thus left with biographical, mostly descriptive, accounts of war captivity. While these 
sometimes appear to offer little more than an enumeration of minor hardships and prison life 
anecdotes, seemingly confirming that for Western forces, war captivity was a largely 
unremarkable, even if unpleasant, experience, readers will however find themselves 
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struck by a sense of unease and melancholy that pervades all these accounts, and the cause 
of which is often difficult to locate. There is a sense that something happened in the camps 
after all, that war captivity was an experience that was not just unpleasant, but in some way 
disturbing. After the war, many ex-POWs thus found it difficult to talk or write about their 
time in captivity until much later in life. Like many others, Levinas and his fellow inmates 
did not keep in touch (Malka, 2006: 78), and Levinas himself hardly ever spoke about this 
time and only rarely mentioned it in his work. Can this really be attributed merely to 
survivor’s guilt or the urge of prisoners to forget and move on after the war (Malka, 2006: 
78)? 
 
 
This article asks what happens to subjectivity in a space of exclusion devoid of engagement 
by others. It will first set out the conditions of Levinas’s war captivity, before then mapping 
the imagined interruption of relations to persons and things set out in Existence and Existents 
onto the real interruption of relations experienced by Levinas in the camp. It will argue that 
in the camp, prisoners were left in a state of suspension between life and death in which their 
subjectivity progressively dissolved until there was only impersonal existence: 
 
 
For where the continual play of our relations with the world is interrupted we find neither 
death nor the ‘pure ego,’ but the anonymous state of being . . . the Being which we become 
Page 9 of 47  
 
 
 
 
 
aware of when the world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the sum total of persons 
and things; it is the fact that one is, the fact that there is. (Levinas, 2001: 8) 
 
 
The project of reading a philosophical concept into a historical situation and from there into 
a space conditioned by law does not come without its own problems. One of these is the 
existing philosophical and literary genealogy of the ‘there is,’ which reaches back to the 
thought of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot before the war (see, for example, 
Bernasconi, 2001; Caygill, 2002: 49-69; Davies, 1990; Fagenblat, 2005; Large, 2002; 
Robbins, 1999: 91-116 and Rolland, 2003.) Indeed, Levinas himself writes in the preface to 
Existence and Existents that even though ‘these studies . . . were . . . written down for the 
most part in captivity,’ they had been ‘begun before the war’ (2001: xxvii). Without 
contesting the significance and interest of these connections and continuities, as well as the 
philosophical interpretations and analyses that have been advanced of the concept generally 
(for very different examples of these, see Bergo, 1999; Caygill, 2002; Critchley, 1997; 
Fagenblat, 2002; Large, 2002; Morgan, 2007; Rose, 1992; de Vries, 2005; Wood, 2005), this 
article proceeds on the understanding that philosophical concepts may draw their life from 
more than one source, and that adding to these sources enlarges the range of theoretical 
possibilities that a concept may offer. After all, Levinas himself (in Levinas and Robbins, 
2001: 96-97) states that ‘[i]t is incontestable that in every philosophical reflection, 
Page 10 of 47  
 
 
 
 
 
in every philosophical essay, there are memories of a lived experience which is not rigorously 
intellectual.’ 
 
 
Another hurdle that a project such as this may encounter is the sometimes-held view of 
Levinas as a post-Holocaust thinker. In this respect, one can distinguish between those who 
claim that Levinas’s work offers a response to the Holocaust as an event of his time (in which 
he was involved through the death of a number of family members as well as through his 
position as a philosopher and Jewish thinker) and those who claim that Levinas personally 
experienced the Holocaust and that some of his thought is directly attributable to that 
experience. The former view is held, amongst others, by Robert Bernasconi (1995: 81), who 
states that Levinas’s work responds to the Jewish experience of being ‘universally 
persecuted’ (also see Plant, 2014). The latter view is exemplified by Sarah Hammerschlag’s 
description of Levinas’s writings immediately after the war as ‘an attempt at re- appropriating 
the experience of being persecuted’ (2012: 394) and Seán Hand’s statement that Levinas’s 
wartime writings refer to a ‘period of persecution and endurance’ (2013: 45, footnote 
omitted). Didier Pollefeyt (2015: 323) specifically regards the ‘there is’ as ‘based on the 
traumatic experience of the Holocaust.’ 
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It is the latter account, not the former, which this article disputes, both through the historical 
material that it offers and through its proposal to read the ‘there is’ as the evil arising in the 
face of no other rather than in the face of violence and persecution. The fact that Levinas 
himself at times appears to blur the line between what he experienced and the experiences he 
felt to be rightly his,3 only highlights how difficult it was to carry forward the memory of a 
time where nothing happened. 
 
 
In German war captivity 
 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, Levinas felt himself part of a movement of 
religious affirmation and political opposition that had arisen as a result of the hatred directed 
against Jews in the first half of the century. Henri Bergson may serve as an example of the 
sentiments and choices this involved. To Levinas’s admiration, Bergson (in Malka, 2006: 24) 
offered in 1937 the following explanation for his decision not to convert to Catholicism 
despite an attraction to the faith: ‘I would have converted had I not seen the formidable wave 
of anti-Semitism which broke out over the world taking shape over the years. I wanted to 
remain among those who would be persecuted.’ 
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Underlying this wish ‘to remain amongst those who would be persecuted’ was not just a 
feeling of solidarity but also the belief that for Jews, an active association with their faith had 
ceased to be a matter of choice. As Levinas (1990a: 69) had already explained in his 1934 
essay Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism, the kind of truth bound to one’s physical 
embodiment that was expounded by Hitlerism left no escape. In 1935, Levinas (in Rolland, 
2003: 74) then came to think of Hitlerism as ‘the greatest trial – an incomparable trial – 
through which Judaism has had to pass. . . . The pathetic destiny of being Jewish becomes a 
fatality. One can no longer flee it. The Jew is ineluctably riveted to his Judaism.’ 
 
 
Once the war started, the fight against anti-Semitism was one, but not the only motivation 
for Levinas to join the army on the side of France. According to his son Michael (in Malka, 
2006: 263), Levinas held ‘a Napoleonic image of France against the Russia of pogroms,’ an 
image he saw confirmed in 1931 when the French state granted him citizenship, and which 
now contributed to his readiness to join the army. For Levinas, the war had taken on ‘a double 
meaning’ (Berg, 1990: 197) both as the fight against Hitler’s anti-Semitism and against his 
territorial ambitions. 
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Levinas was deployed as a translator with non-commissioned officer (‘NCO’) status. After 
only a few months of action, he entered war captivity in June 1940, having been captured at 
Rennes together with hundreds of thousands of other French forces. At that point, Levinas 
firmly expected to become the subject of persecution; he assumed a stance of defiance and, 
unlike many others, declared his faith openly. According to his son, Levinas then spent the 
next five years in the expectation of imminent deportation and death, accepting this to be his 
fate as a Jew (Malka, 2006: 262). 
 
 
However, Levinas’s German captors had no intention of sending him to a concentration 
camp. As evidenced by the low mortality rate amongst Western POWs (Overmans, 1999b: 
14), Germany largely observed the requirements of the Geneva Convention in relation to its 
enemies on the Western front (Britain, France and the USA) and included within this 
compliance their Jewish members. Yves Durand (1999: 73) thus writes that ‘the German 
armed forces by no means followed national socialist principles in this case, but complied 
with the general rules of the laws of war.’ He rightly calls this a ‘most astonishing’ 
circumstance (Durand, 1999: 73). 
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As astonishing as it was, the reasons for the protection of Jewish POWs should be sought in 
politics and strategy rather than in moral scruples. There were considerations of reciprocity 
on the German side, as well as the perceived need to maintain an atmosphere in which 
collaboration with France remained possible. There was also, perhaps most crucially, the fact 
that POW camps were administered and overseen by the German military rather than the SS. 
Although the German military was by no means innocent of the murder of Jews elsewhere, 
the survival of Western POWs of Jewish faith can be said to have been largely attributable to 
its refusal to allow Germany’s security and paramilitary forces to interfere in matters of POW 
administration. In this respect, the recognition by the military that the type of war fought on 
the Western front could not be practically combined with Nazi ideology without damaging 
the military’s interests and objectives played an important part. After all, the war on the 
Western front was – particularly in the early stages – still conducted as a limited, 
‘gentlemanly’ (Best, 1980: 218) war between equals, and Western POWs attracted the 
professional solidarity of German military personnel. Durand (1982: 324 and 354) even states 
that there was an ‘effective respect of the quality of Jewish soldiers’ despite their occasional 
bullying by the Germans. 
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This meant that Jewish POWs found themselves in a peculiar situation, in which ‘[d]e facto 
the safest place for a Jew in the German sphere of influence was in an Oflag or a Stalag’4 
(Overmans, 2005: 872). Although Jewish POWs were often separated from their non- Jewish 
compatriots and, where they were required to work, were sometimes discriminated against 
and harassed,5 they were generally not in danger of their lives (Overmans, 1999a: 
503) (although an exception to this occurred in instances where Jewish doctors were tasked 
with looking after those that had fallen ill in epidemics without receiving prior vaccinations; 
see Stelzl-Marx, 2000: 770, Durand, 1982: 354 and Berg, 1990: 201.) The camps thus became 
islands of protection within a doubly hostile territory. 
 
 
One million French prisoners of war, Levinas amongst them, remained in Germany until the 
end of the war. The POWs were divided amongst a large number of camps across Germany 
(there were almost 250 POW camps in Germany by the end of the war, each with countless 
satellite work camps, in total numbering in their thousands (Overmans, 2005: 853). Levinas 
is commonly said to have been held at the POW camp Stalag XI B at Fallingbostel near 
Hanover. Stalag XI B was established in 1939 on the site of a German military training 
ground that stretches over the Lüneburg Heath. The POWs were accommodated in wooden 
temporary barracks, around which fences were drawn. These 
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barracks had initially been erected for the workers who were building the training ground in 
1935, and Stalag XI B and the cluster of other camps that arose in the area of Fallingbostel 
(including the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen (not Buchenwald, as Salomon Malka 
(2006: 263) mistakenly notes)) were now surrounding the training ground, which remained 
active during the war. 
 
 
A large number of prisoners were held in the camps at Fallingbostel; at its peak in 1944, the 
cluster of camps held 96,000 POWs of different nationalities (Fallingbostel Military 
Museum),6 thereby constituting one of the largest POW camp complexes in Germany at the 
time (Stiftung niedersächsische Gedänkstätten). General living conditions are likely to have 
been similar to most Stammlager, with overcrowding, rudimentary sanitation and medical 
care, insufficient or non-existent heating, infestation with vermin, and inadequate food and 
clothing being the norm (Tyas, 2010: 180). 
 
 
It is unlikely, however, that Levinas was held at Stalag XI B itself. Affiliated to each Stalag 
were a myriad of smaller satellite camps – in the case of Stalag XI B, these numbered more 
than 2,000 (Stiftung niedersächsische Gedänkstätten) – that often consisted of little more than 
some barracks adjacent to a factory or farm. Levinas and his seventy or so Jewish 
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comrades-in-arms (Levinas, 1990b: 152) appear to have lived in such a satellite camp, a 
disused farm called ‘Stelterhof’ located in the vicinity of the forest in which they were put to 
work (Levinas, 2011: 27). This was nothing unusual; many POWs were accommodated near 
to their place of work, as there was often no transport available and the daily return to the 
main camp would have been impracticable or impossible on foot. 
 
 
While no information is available on the precise capacity in which Levinas worked in the 
forest (his son describes him as having been a ‘lumberjack’ (in Malka, 2006: 261)), it is 
known that the workers in his detail got up at dawn and worked until about six o’clock with 
one lunch break. After that, they had time to themselves (Malka, 2006: 77). They also had 
one day off each week, which placed them in a better position than many ordinary foot- 
soldiers, whom Stephen Tyas (2010: 200) reports as having been ‘forced to work 12 hours  a 
day, day after day, every week of every month for years.’7 Although the work detail was 
restricted to Jewish prisoners, there is no indication that the work its members carried out 
was any more degrading or punishing than that of other details. POWs are said to have 
generally preferred work in the agricultural sector over that in the mining and production 
industries, as working and living conditions in the countryside were thought to be better 
(Bories-Sawala, 1996: 216-217). It is therefore reasonable to assume that Levinas’s work 
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did not belong amongst the harshest types of work even amongst French POWs (not to 
mention POWs of other nationalities and other types of foreign workers, which were often 
treated much worse). The fact that Howard Caygill (2010: 28) writes that Levinas ‘as a Jew 
was set to work in a “Forestry Commando Unit” specifically assembled for Jewish POWs,’ 
and that this meant ‘that his experience of the camp was even more insecure and traumatic 
than that of his fellow non-Jewish POWs’ should therefore not, without more evidence, be 
taken as an inference of hardship or maltreatment that may have been targeted specifically at 
Jews. All French NCOs were effectively required to work, and while the legality of this 
requirement under international law was disputed even at the time (for more details, see 
Bories-Sawala, 1996 and Durand, 1982 and 1999), there was no distinction made in this 
respect between Jews and non-Jews.8 It is true that Levinas and his fellow Jewish POWs 
perceived their general protection by the Geneva Convention as less secure than did their 
non-Jewish colleagues, a perception to which the segregation of Jewish prisoners from other 
POWs undoubtedly contributed (Levinas, 2009: 210). But the actual living and working 
conditions of Levinas’s detail do not appear to have been particularly hard, and are unlikely 
to have reached the ‘cruel reduction to the minimal conditions necessary for survival’ that 
Jeffrey Bloechl (2011: 116) refers to. And while Levinas may have technically been a forced 
labourer, he was in a far better position than many of the civilian 
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forced labourers employed in Germany at the time. Indeed, one might say that Levinas’s 
position emerges as one of ‘relative privilege’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996: 215) in this respect. 
 
 
The work in the forest, for instance, appears to have left free time that Levinas and his fellow 
prisoners were able to fill with other occupations. Prisoners in Levinas’s group are reported 
to have been able to send letters and receive parcels, have access to books and stage theatrical 
events (Malka, 2006: 76f). Levinas continued to be philosophically occupied during his time 
in captivity, reading a number of philosophical works, scribbling from time to time into a 
little notebook and reading to the other prisoners ‘from texts that would make little sense to 
them’ (Malka, 2006: 78). 
 
 
Prison life also appears to have afforded Levinas an escape from bourgeois existence. After 
the war, he thus recalls the ‘romantic’ aspects of war imprisonment, in which prisoners were 
experiencing ‘an exceptional present,’ ‘a new rhythm of life’ due in large part to the freedom 
from concerns of bourgeois existence that war captivity entailed (Levinas, 2009: 201-203). 
This freedom was involuntary – after all it was imprisonment that had resulted in the loss of 
connection with families and peers, possessions and projects – but despite this 
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involuntariness, the prisoners felt that their lives were expanding as soon as the weight of 
ordinary existence had been lifted off them: 
 
 
Paradoxical as it may seem, they [the prisoners] experienced in the narrow expanse [dans la 
close étendue] of the camps a magnitude of life larger and, under the eye of the sentinel, an 
unexpected freedom. They were not bourgeois, and that is their real adventure, their true 
romance. (Levinas, 2009: 201-202) 
 
 
The Jewish prisoners were able to celebrate their religious holidays, even if only 
clandestinely, and Levinas (2009) experienced a spiritual awakening during his time in the 
camp. In a departure from the often sombre tones elsewhere in his captivity diaries, he 
describes a sense of floating created by the detachment from the world prisoners had left 
behind, as if existence had become unmoored: 
 
 
Drunkenness is not only the effect of wine. It is this stage of detachment, the output of the 
life that we can know in every kind of excitement. The commando Sunday evening. The ease 
of everything because we are detached from everything. (Levinas, 2009: 83) 
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Critchley interprets this sense of freedom in the light of Levinas’s later thought, where 
freedom also occurs under constraint, namely under the investment of freedom ‘by 
responsibility to the infinite demand of the other’ (Critchley, 2015: 62). In the camp, 
however, the constraint enabling the prisoners’ ‘freedom’ was the opposite of a relation in 
which the other always already calls the self to responsibility. Here, imprisonment followed 
from the exclusion from all relations of accountability. Cut loose from the world, prisoners 
found themselves in a space in which no demands were made of them, in which there was no 
rehabilitation to accomplish and no redemption to hope for. Far from a ‘condition for 
liberation’ (Critchley, 2015: 62), the camp revealed itself as a space in which the freedom 
from the demands of bourgeois existence was soon crushed by ‘[t]he absence of everything 
[that] returns as presence . . .’ (Levinas, 1987a: 46): the ‘horror’ and ‘evil’ (Levinas, 2001: 
4-5) of the ‘there is.’ 
 
 
The ‘there is’ 
 
In Existence and Existents, Levinas (2001: 51-52) introduces the ‘there is’ as follows: ‘Let 
us imagine all beings, things and persons, reverting to nothingness. . . . [W]hat of this 
nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the silence of nothingness.’ 
This ‘nothing’ does not just appear, but develops in three stages: First, like in Levinas’s 
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captivity diaries, there is detachment from the world, the ‘reverting to nothingness’ of people 
and things that give one’s world meaning. Unlike in his captivity diaries, however, this 
detachment does not lead to freedom in this instance, and there is no mentioning of ‘romance’ 
and ‘excitement.’ On the contrary, the loss of access to the world becomes the absence of 
light, a darkness in which the subject finds itself alone, without support for its existence. 
Second, in the absence that surrounds it, the subject senses a presence in which the negation 
of people and things returns as the ‘silence of nothingness.’ Third, the subject itself takes part 
in this nothingness, its life faltering in the ‘heavy atmosphere’ (Levinas, 2001: 53) and 
‘suffocating embrace’ (Levinas, 2001: 9) of the ‘there is.’ 
 
 
It is tempting to equate the scenario that Levinas (2001: 7) describes at the beginning of 
Existence and Existents, where he uses phrases such as ‘the twilight of a world’ or ‘the end 
of the world,’ with the death of ‘Justice’ or the ‘world put in question by Hitler’s triumphs’ 
that he refers to after the war when he imagines the world from the perspective of Holocaust 
victims (Levinas, 1996a: 119). It is important to realise, however, that for the purpose of the 
‘there is,’ the world that is sinking away from the subject is not the world the subject believes 
in, but the world as constituted by the subject’s interlocutors, its meaningful others. Once 
these relations are cut, the world disappears from the subject’s 
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view, but it does not thereby cease to exist. The issue with the ‘there is,’ in other words, is 
not the end of, but the exclusion from the world. 
 
 
This becomes clear from the examples of the ‘there is’ that Levinas provides. These examples 
describe what happens when one attempts to sever the relation to another or when such 
severance is forced upon one. The examples express the surprise that freedom nevertheless 
does not ensue, followed closely by the realisation that the space created by the absence of 
the other has filled with a horrible presence. Levinas (2001: 56) thus remarks about the return 
of Banquo’s ghost to Macbeth after the latter has murdered him: ‘To kill, like to die, is to 
seek an escape from being, to go where freedom and negation operate. Horror is the event of 
being which returns in the heart of this negation, as though nothing had happened.’ In later 
interviews it is a child, perhaps Levinas himself as a child, who senses an indefinite presence 
in the room after having been ‘[torn] away from the life of the adults and put . . . to bed a bit 
too early’ (Levinas, 2001: 45): ‘One sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the 
silence of his bedroom as “rumbling”’ (Levinas, 1985: 48). 
 
 
Although the ‘there is’ appears when others disappear, it does not thereby represent what 
happens in mourning, nor is it an expression of abandonment or homesickness. Rather, it 
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represents a different relation to the world that emerges only in the absence of others and the 
meaning they give to one’s life. As such, the ‘there is’ is neither an objective aspect of the 
world – i.e., the world absent of meaning – nor a subjective feeling on the part of the subject. 
It is an absence of meaning that has materialised as a new relation to the world, a relation 
with nothing, a non-relation. 
 
 
In the POW camp, prisoners were excluded from two momentous events of their time, the 
Second World War and the Holocaust. This proved problematic for some prisoners. Those 
who in joining the war had been out for ‘“[t]he chop or the top” – death or glory’ (Smith, 
1968: 27) felt themselves ‘neutralised’ in captivity, realising that they were now permanently 
excluded from a war whose significance had determined their existence. For Levinas, too, 
who had joined the war with enthusiasm (Malka, 2006: 25), hearing news about the ongoing 
hostilities during his time in the camp caused him to realise that ‘[h]is true destiny, his true 
salvation, was being carried out elsewhere’ (Levinas, 2009: 202). As to the Holocaust, Jewish 
POWs effectively missed an event that was to become of unparalleled significance for 
modern Jewish identity, an event that to Levinas’s mind was ‘[t]he great “experience” of 
Judaism,’ the ‘passion in the same sense as one speaks of the suffering [Leiden] of Christ 
under the Romans’ (Levinas, 2001: 137) and ‘the Passion of 
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Israel at Auschwitz’ (Levinas, 2001: 226). As Joseph Lador-Lederer (1980: 71) writes, ‘for 
the Jewish prisoner of war of a Western country who benefited from the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 1929, his sufferings measured against yardsticks of Jewish 
martyrology, were a matter de minimis.’ 
 
 
However, exclusion was not the only feature of war captivity, which was also pervaded by a 
sense of indifference on the part of others. Both the war and the persecutions involved the 
same enemy figure, but while prisoners and camp guards nominally remained enemies in a 
state of war, they no longer opposed each other, as Germany continued to direct its efforts to 
the front. The prisoners’ existence – an existence which until recently had been judged to 
warrant the application of lethal force – was now a matter of indifference to their captors, 
who looked at the prisoners without interest or hatred. If their existence mattered at all, it did 
so only in so far as it could support the war effort through the maintenance of reciprocal 
relations between Germany and France and the provision of labour to the war economy. 
Sydney Smith (1968: 133) thus recounts how one long-term POW told him he had ‘felt 
sometimes that the war had left him behind like a piece of useless wrack on the tideline of 
1939.’ 
Page 26 of 47  
 
 
 
 
 
Not only was war captivity not an extension of combat nor amounted to persecution that 
could be resisted, it was also not something that the law imposed either as a punishment or 
as a measure of protecting prisoners’ agency, whether out of humanitarian concerns or 
otherwise. It was in fact not directed at the prisoners at all. As a legal institution, the function 
of war imprisonment at this time was still primarily to protect war, not its participants. The 
law excluded those who surrendered or were defeated from further violent action only to 
ensure that war would end at defeat rather than annihilation. Plurality was a guarantee for 
war, as it kept open the possibility of future wars. The beneficiary, i.e., that which law 
intended to protect, was therefore war itself and not the prisoners. The latter were merely the 
living proof that limited war was being conducted, their collective lives constituting the 
border between limited and unlimited war (Jacques, 2015). 
 
 
As such, the POW camp was a neutral space, even though this was not the benevolent and 
provisional sense of neutrality commonly conceived. The camp did not constitute a ground 
from which prisoners could freely proceed to choose sides; it was not a basis for but an 
exclusion from agency. War captivity excluded prisoners from all the meaningful categories 
of agency in war (enemy, friend, foe, neutral), reducing the prisoners to an indeterminate 
existence and confining them to a space in-between whose co-ordinates suddenly appeared 
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uncertain. Where was one if one was no longer on the human map of enmity, could no longer 
even reach the ground from which one could choose sides? Was one still amongst humans, 
still human? Levinas writes about the ‘inhuman neutrality’ (in Rolland, 2003: 27) of the 
‘there is,’ its ‘horrific neutrality’ (Levinas, 1990b: 292). 
 
 
Some of the prisoners sought to escape from this state of forced neutrality. They hatched out 
plans to provoke their captors by playing pranks on them (‘“goon-baiting”’ (Smith, 1968: 
78)), or more seriously, attempted to escape from the camp altogether. At stake in these 
attempts to turn the enemy’s attention back towards them was not only the participating 
prisoners’ sense of identity and purpose, but also their individuality. War imprisonment 
meant prisoners were permanently condemned to the anonymity of their number and unit, as 
they no longer had the opportunity to distinguish themselves individually through action; in 
escaping, they saw a chance to regain this individuality in front of their fellow inmates as 
well as their home nation.9 
 
However, it was mainly English and American officers, a small minority of all POWs, who 
engaged in these activities. For those who had to work as well as for Jewish prisoners whose 
uniform constituted the only protection from being sent to a concentration camp, 
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such pastimes were not a realistic option. Nevertheless, Levinas’s open declaration of his 
faith to his captors can be regarded as an individual act of defiance in this sense, and may be 
an indication of his resistance to the forced neutrality of war captivity. 
 
 
There was no response to this act of defiance, at least not one that measured up to the strength 
of Levinas’s own feelings of opposition. It is likely that it was this lack of response that 
created a sense of insecurity for the Jewish prisoners more so than the fact that the Geneva 
Convention constituted a fragile means of protection. As Levinas (2001: 53) writes about the 
‘there is,’ absence ‘becomes insecurity. . . [n]ot because things covered by darkness elude 
our foresight and . . . it becomes impossible to measure their approach in advance . . . [but 
because] nothing approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens . . ..’ 
 
 
This lack of response must have also heightened Levinas’s perception of in-difference on the 
part of his captors, i.e., the feeling of no longer constituting a difference. Is it still possible to 
have a relation with one’s foe when he no longer recognises one’s difference, and be it only 
for the purpose of assimilation or annihilation? What happens to the subject outside of such 
a relation, when it finds itself confronted by nothing, or rather, nothing other than ‘the fact 
that there is’ (Levinas, 2001: 8)? For the early Levinas (2001: 45, 
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emphasis added), existence means being in the world while at the same time being ‘able to 
withdraw from the world.’ Existence needs interiority, a place of self set apart from the 
difference of the other. The ‘there is,’ however, offers no difference, and therefore no place 
to hide: ‘Before this obscure invasion it is impossible to take shelter in oneself, to withdraw 
into one’s shell’ (Levinas, 2001: 54). The subject, William Large explains, loses its footing 
in the ‘there is,’ unable to retain its subjectivity: 
 
 
For what holds me to my existence is my relation to things and people; when this relation 
disappears, my own existence as something personal is also extinguished. As a pure 
interiority, it cannot be said to be mine at all. It is the impersonality of existence outside of 
any specific relation to things and people. Yet if this interiority is no longer mine, in what 
sense is it interior? (Large, 2002: 138) 
 
 
When Levinas talks about the ‘unbearable indifference’ of the ‘there is’ (Levinas, 2001: 45), 
this is therefore unlikely to have been a matter of bemoaning the indifference of the world to 
one’s own suffering, or indeed, of celebrating the ‘benign indifference of the world’ that goes 
on while oneself has to die (Camus, 1982: 117). Rather, indifference itself is the source of 
suffering. In the ‘there is,’ where ‘anything can count for anything else’ (Levinas, 2001: 54), 
one literally does not ‘bear’ anything, as there are no particular beings 
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or things against which the self can establish its difference. As in the camp, in which prisoners 
were merely one part of a larger unit and private existence was impossible – impossible to 
the extent that solitary confinement became a treat rather than the punishment as which it 
was intended (Kochavi, 2005: 56) – the subject drowns in the undifferentiated being of the 
‘there is,’ the ‘I’ becoming a mere ‘one,’ participating in being ‘without having taken the 
initiative, anonymously’ (Levinas, 2001: 53). When Levinas was asked after the war whether 
Stalag XI B was the face of evil, he responded: ‘Evil has no face’ (in Malka, 2006: 75). 
 
 
The idea of facelessness implies not only the absence of a face or a face turned away, but 
also the inability to ‘read’ the intentions of the other. In the ‘there is,’ whatever happens – 
and strictly speaking, nothing happens – happens without an author that can be determined. 
‘Like the third person pronoun in the impersonal form of a verb, it [the indeterminateness] 
designates not the uncertainly known author of the action, but the characteristic of this action 
itself which somehow has no author’ (Levinas, 2001: 52). Levinas (2001: 64, emphasis 
added) writes about existence in the ‘there is’ as having ‘no master’ and as a ‘being that 
belongs to no one.’ For the prisoners, this meant that once their existence had merged with 
the indeterminate being around them, they could not own their experience, 
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which was neither self-determined nor attributable to the actions of others. Not only was 
there no-one else to blame, there was also no agency they themselves could lay claim to. 
Although they were working during the day, this work appeared senseless: ‘[T]hey perform 
actions in the real world without reality,’ Levinas writes about the POWs, ‘not only an 
absence of objects but an absence of progress, of achievement’ (Levinas, 2009: 126).10 
 
The loss of ownership of one’s life in the camp, the draining away of one’s subjectivity, could 
only be stemmed by recourse to the camp’s physical and temporal outside. Mail and news 
about the on-going war temporarily pierced the emptiness, reminding prisoners that there was 
an outside world after all, a world which contained – paradoxically, it was the outside that 
contained, while the contained space of the prison camp was empty – a meaningful past and 
future. 
 
 
However, both past and future became more difficult concepts for the POWs the longer their 
captivity lasted. The trauma of action and capture distanced prisoners from their past life, and 
interrogators were skilled in further reducing prisoners’ emotional ties to the world they left 
behind in order to increase their control over them. Sooner or later, prisoners discovered that 
they were no longer able to remember details about their past. ‘Every 
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prisoner finds that his memory fails him in some way. He cannot remember dates, names, 
streets, addresses or his own phone number in his home. The past seems to fade out and there 
is only the present’ (Lunden, 1948-1949: 731). As to the future, which ‘alone could finally 
date and give meaning to life’ (Durand, 1987: 137-138), it moved ever further away as it 
became more difficult for prisoners to imagine how they could take up the severed threads 
of their lives. Without the hope of a future (‘because one never knows when it will finally 
begin’ (Durand, 1987: 137)) the present turned into ‘a miserable present’ (Durand, 1987: 
137), its usually fleeting character replaced by permanence. As one POW describes, the 
immediacy of this present was overwhelming, ‘melting’ (Spanos, 2010: 57) any remaining 
hopes and memories. In the words of another POW (in Kochavi, 2005: 57): ‘At the moment 
I feel there is no future, I have forgotten the past and am just living in a dream from day to 
day.’ 
 
 
For Levinas, this dream turned out to be a nightmare. What had at first been a sense of 
liberation, a floating present freed from bourgeois constraints, became the empty weight of 
meaninglessness. He writes in his prison diaries: ‘The sense of nightmare. Reality still – 
absolutely foreign. Night in daylight’ (Levinas, 2009: 87). This was not a nightmare of the 
kind concentration camp inmates lived. Rather, if the ‘there is’ is to be taken as 
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representative, it was akin to a state of insomnia from which one is unable to escape through 
either sleep or consciousness. To the insomniac, Levinas (1987a: 48) writes, insomnia 
appears as if ‘it will never finish,’ it is the present become permanent. The absence of others 
and of time – and thus of meaning – causes being to become undifferentiated, being without 
beings, without a physical or temporal beginning or end. The ‘there is’ is ‘irremissible 
existence’ (Levinas, 2001: 58), ‘the horror of the unceasing, of a monotony deprived of 
meaning’ (Levinas, 2001: 45). What happens, Levinas might have asked more concretely 
when introducing the ‘there is,’ when meaningful life ends and yet one does not die? As the 
son of a fellow POW of Levinas recalls (in Malka, 2006: xxxi), the prisoners felt they lived 
suspended ‘between the living and the dead.’ In his captivity diaries Levinas (2009: 126) 
describes the members of his unit as ‘phantoms;’ in Existence and Existents he uses the same 
term for the ‘there is’ (Levinas, 2001: 56). 
 
 
One would think that the importance Levinas ascribes to the absence of the possibility of 
death within the ‘there is’ would have led him to affirm rather than dispute the status of death 
in Heidegger’s Being and Time. However, Levinas (2001: 58) contrasts his own account of 
the horror of the ‘there is’ as pure being with the anxiety before death as nothingness he 
attributes to Heidegger: 
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The horror of the night, as an experience of the there is, does not then reveal to us a danger 
of death, nor even a danger of pain. . . . There is horror of being and not anxiety over 
nothingness, fear of being and not fear for being; there is being prey to, delivered over to 
something that is not a “something.” (Levinas, 2001: 57-58) 
 
 
Levinas then claims that the ‘there is’ as pure being is not just the primordial object of fear, 
but also the real ‘nothingness’ – a nothingness that can be experienced as an interruption in 
the middle of one’s life and should therefore no longer be located at its limits: 
 
 
One starts with being, which is a content limited by nothingness. Nothingness is still 
envisaged as the end and limit of being, as an ocean which beats up against it on all sides. 
But we must ask if “nothingness,” unthinkable as a limit or negation of being, is not possible 
as interval and interruption . . .. (Levinas, 2001: 60) 
 
 
Nothingness conceived as an interval means that being is no longer opposed to nothingness, 
but incorporates it as its central element. Unless there are relations that give life meaning, 
being is nothingness, a dying of a certain kind of death. Levinas (2001: 5) writes that 
‘[e]xistence of itself harbours something tragic which is not only there because of its 
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finitude.’ On the basis of Levinas’s experience in war captivity, one could perhaps go further 
and say that this tragic aspect of existence appears because there is no finitude, no meaningful 
relations that always already entail the risk of death at the hands of the other. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of his chapter on Levinas’s time in captivity Malka (2006: 64, emphasis 
added) writes that Levinas ‘would come to know, firsthand, the experience of the camps, 
even if it was only a prisoner camp to which he was deported and not an extermination camp.’ 
 
 
One might take issue with this statement for implying a dubious hierarchy of martyrdom, a 
hierarchy which may explain the tendency of some commentators to present Levinas’s time 
in war captivity as an experience of persecution. More importantly, however, one might take 
issue with this statement because it holds up Levinas’s experiences as a prisoner of war 
against what appears to be regarded as the paradigm of camp experience, namely that 
afforded by concentration camps. 
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This article has sought to describe the historical and legal conditions of Levinas’s 
imprisonment in a bid to establish the experience of war captivity as one of interest in its own 
right. It attempted to show that the law excluded prisoners such as Levinas from all 
meaningful relations, holding them fast in a space in which their agency was suspended and 
which, although surrounded by others, was regarded by no-one. By reading the experience 
of war captivity through Levinas’s concept of the ‘there is,’ this article sought to articulate 
the impact of this exclusion on prisoners’ subjectivity. 
 
 
Although one cannot but recognise that it was law which saved Levinas’s life during the 
Second World War, it was also law which, through its mechanisms of exclusion, was 
responsible for the loss of world and ensuing meaninglessness that he and his fellow prisoners 
experienced. It is hoped that the above analysis will contribute to understanding the impact 
of law on those whom it neither enables to live a meaningful life nor entirely excludes from 
its remit, but simply holds in a space of indifference until such time as it chooses to release 
them. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 Their experience of war captivity may, of course, be interesting for a variety of other 
reasons, not least for its potential impact on the subsequent work of these thinkers. The 
significance of war captivity for 20th century thought – and not only French thought, as one 
might also think of, for example, Niklas Luhmann’s detention as a POW in the USA after the 
war – has not yet been systematically explored. 
2    The  role  that  the  ‘there  is’   plays  in   Levinas’s  mature  work,   where  it   re-appears 
 
occasionally (see, for example, Levinas, 1969: 263; 1987b: 165-166; 1996b: 159; 1998: 176 
and 183) is complex and beyond the scope of this article (for one particular view on this 
question, see Critchley, 1996). What seems clear is that Levinas sought (and found) 
‘deliverance’ from the ‘there is’ in the ethical relation to the other: ‘I distrust the 
compromised word “love,” but the responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other, seemed 
to me, as early as that time, to stop the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being. It  is in 
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the form of such a relation that the deliverance from the “there is” appeared to me’ (Levinas, 
1985: 52). 
3 For Levinas’s views on the significance of the Holocaust for Jewish identity, see the 
 
section on the ‘there is’ below. Sometimes Levinas himself comes close to suggesting that 
he was a victim of persecution. For example, he ends the statement quoted above about the 
lived experience present in every philosophical work by saying about his own work: ‘I do 
not contest that it is a Jewish ordeal which is translated’ (in Levinas and Robbins, 2001: 96- 
97). For other examples, see Mortley, 1991: 21 and Levinas, 1996a: 119. However, when 
Levinas (1990b: 291) states that his life has been ‘dominated by the presentiment and the 
memory of the Nazi horror,’ it is all too obvious that the space between ‘presentiment’ and 
‘memory’ that might otherwise be taken up by experience remains empty. 
4 An Oflag or Offizierslager was a POW camp for commissioned officers, while a Stalag or 
 
Stammlager was a camp for all lower-ranked personnel. An Oflag generally afforded 
prisoners better living conditions than a Stalag. Furthermore, because commissioned officers 
could not be required to work under the Geneva Convention, it also afforded them a better 
experience of war captivity as a whole. 
5  It is difficult to establish the precise extent of this discrimination and harassment. Howard 
 
Levie (1977: 175 n324, reference omitted) states that ‘Germany attempted . . . to separate 
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Jewish prisoners of war from the other prisoners of war of the same nationality, with the 
admonition that “in all other respects” they were to receive treatment identical to that received 
by their fellow nationals.’ Similarly, Ricoeur (1998: 19-20) states: ‘I know that a certain 
number of Jews were sent into separate camps, sometimes with prisoners reputed to be 
subversive; but I have not read that these Jewish prisoners who were moved were made to 
suffer harsh treatment.’ However, Roger Berg (1990: 201) finds that the special work units 
to which Jews were assigned were ‘in most cases’ disciplinary in nature, and Durand (1982: 
354) states that Jews had to carry out especially strenuous work. 
6 Gianfranco Mattiello and Wolfgang Vogt (1986-1987: 22) as well as the Stiftung 
 
niedersächsische Gedänkstätten (2013) cite a figure of 95,000 prisoners under their 
information on Stalag XI B, Malka (2006: 68) a figure of 32,000 prisoners, and the Pegasus 
Archive of 49,138 prisoners. These lower figures are likely to refer either to the main camp 
on its own (without its satellite camps) or to the total number of prisoners at certain points in 
time. 
7 There are other former Western POWs who have given hellish accounts of German war 
 
captivity (see, for example, Spanos, 2010), attesting to the fact that the conditions and 
experience of war captivity varied widely even amongst Western POWs. 
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8 From a conversation with Ricoeur, Simon Critchley (2015: 65) reports that Levinas had to 
work because he was a Jew, while Ricoeur as a non-Jew did not. However, the relevant 
distinguishing factor between them is more likely to have been that Levinas was a NCO while 
Ricoeur was an officer. 
9 The anonymity of POWs continued after war. While the nation concentrated on the actions of the 
 
résistance, whose members became the ‘individualised, heroicised elite of 1945,’ ex-POWs were 
still presented as the defensive units they had been in 1940-41, i.e. as an ‘anonymous mass’ (Durand, 
1987: 17). 
10 In this context, one may also note that work did not constitute a means of escape for 
 
Levinas. Caygill (2010: 28) thus writes that ‘the experience of forced labour in the Stalag, 
accompanied by a critical reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in the prison camp 
reading room, led Levinas to an extreme degree of scepticism about the liberatory potential 
of work . . ..’ Also see Caygill, 2002: 59-62. 
